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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
 Pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, amici make the following disclosures. Pinterest, Inc. does not have 
a parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more 
of its stock. Tumblr, Inc.’s parent corporation is Yahoo! Inc.; Yahoo! Inc. 
does not have a parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation 
owns 10% or more of its stock. Twitter, Inc. does not have a parent cor-
poration and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 
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Pinterest, Inc., Tumblr, Inc., and Twitter, Inc. submit this amicus 
curiae brief to explain some of the serious operational problems that the 
district court’s misapplication of the DMCA’s red-flag knowledge provi-
sion creates for online services. By making it harder for service provid-
ers to obtain DMCA protection when they “interact” with user-
submitted content, the otherwise-thoughtful decision below threatens to 
discourage providers from valuable activities like screening out objec-
tionable content and making useful information easier to locate. This 
Court should reject that result, which undermines Congress’s intent to 
protect—and certainly not to deter—such responsible behavior by 
online services. 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI 
Amici are leading online service providers that offer innovative 
ways for users to express themselves by creating and sharing content.1 
Pinterest, Inc. (“Pinterest”) is an online platform that allows 
people to discover new things and engage with the people who create 
them. Users gather images and other objects (known as “Pins”) from 
                                      
1 Amici and their counsel are solely responsible for this brief. No one 
else helped write it or contributed money for its preparation or submis-
sion. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  
Case: 14-1048     Document: 79     Page: 10      07/30/2014      1282715      45
2 
 
their own collections or from across the web and organize them in 
themed collections called boards. As users browse the millions of boards 
and more than 30 billion Pins available on Pinterest, they can Pin the 
content they find onto their own boards, and follow the users and 
boards they find most useful or inspiring.  
Tumblr, Inc. (“Tumblr”) provides a platform for users to share 
their artwork, writing, photos, audio, and video with a worldwide audi-
ence. Tumblr is home to over 195 million blogs and nearly 83 billion 
posts. The platform allows users to connect with others who share their 
interests, to explore new ideas and creative expressions, and form com-
munities spanning culture, age, and geography. 
Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) is a global platform for public self-
expression and conversation. Twitter has more than 255 million month-
ly active users who share approximately half a billion Tweets each 
day. The unique format of the speech (Tweets are limited to 140 charac-
ters) encourages quick, spontaneous, real-time commentary about is-
sues great and small.  
In operating their services, amici rely on the safe harbor provi-
sions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. 
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§ 512. Amici are the kinds of services for which the DMCA was de-
signed. They provide open platforms where users can store and allow 
others to view content of their choosing. They also allow users to “link” 
to material hosted on other online locations. These activities are covered 
by two separate DMCA safe harbors: Section 512(c) (“storage at the di-
rection of a user”); and Section 512(d) (“referring or linking users to an 
online location containing infringing material”). 
Each minute of every day, hundreds of millions of users around 
the world post all kinds of content on Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter. 
This material allows users to express who they are, what they care 
about, and what’s happening in their lives. The DMCA ensures that le-
gitimate service providers will not as a matter of course face infringe-
ment claims based on such material. By balancing the interests of 
online services, copyright owners, and the public, the safe harbors have 
helped preserve copyright protection while allowing services like amici 
to flourish. Amici have a strong interest in seeing that the DMCA is 
properly applied, taking account of both Congress’s intent and the prac-
tical realities that online services face in interacting with user-
submitted content. Those interests occasion this brief.   
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The DMCA’s knowledge provisions reflect Congress’s decision to 
assign the primary responsibility of identifying online infringement to 
copyright owners, not service providers. In this regime, “red-flag” 
knowledge can exist only where a given infringement would be “obvi-
ous” to any reasonable person. This result is compelled by the DMCA 
and confirmed by the case law. But there are also important practical 
considerations that underscore why red-flag knowledge can be found on-
ly in limited circumstances.  
Congress understood that identifying copyright infringement is 
very difficult for online services. Determining whether a user-posted 
item is infringing requires answering various factual and legal ques-
tions: Is the material protected by copyright? Who owns the relevant 
copyright(s)? Who uploaded the item? Did a copyright owner authorize 
the posting? Is it fair use? Service providers have limited, if any, rele-
vant information on these matters. And these difficulties have only in-
creased as online services such as Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter have 
become home to ever more diverse content from users around the world.  
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In enacting the DMCA, Congress recognized that copyright own-
ers are far better able to determine whether their copyrights are being 
violated. It crafted the statute’s knowledge standards so that service 
providers don’t have to play detective or make judgment calls about in-
fringement. If there’s legitimate uncertainty about whether a given 
item is infringing, there can be no red-flag knowledge. DMCA-
disqualifying knowledge can be found only where the facts known to the 
service provider precluded any reasonable inference that the item at is-
sue was authorized or qualified as fair use.  
This strict standard is necessary because Congress did not want to 
deter online services from interacting with user-submitted content. 
While the DMCA makes clear that service providers are not required to 
monitor their services, Congress recognized that services have compel-
ling reasons for reviewing content on a voluntary basis. Responsible 
services often try to limit the availability of material that may be illegal 
or highly offensive—including obscenity, sexually explicit material, hate 
speech, graphic violence, and bullying. Without these efforts, even the 
best online platforms might get drowned in a sea of crude pornography 
and fake Viagra ads. Interacting with user material also allows desired 
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content to be found in the huge repositories of information that live 
online. By sorting through and organizing users’ posts, service providers 
can help users locate and identify the items that are the most relevant 
and interesting to them. 
Congress approved of these voluntary forms of content review and 
intended the DMCA to make room for them. The legislative history spe-
cifically recognizes the “valuable role” that “human editors and review-
ers” play in “assisting Internet users to identify and locate the infor-
mation they seek.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (1998). And the limited 
sweep of the statute’s knowledge provisions play a crucial role in this 
regard. By relieving service providers of the need to guess about what 
may be infringing, the DMCA gives providers the breathing room they 
need to help users find what they want and avoid what they don’t want.  
Misapplying red-flag knowledge puts all of this at risk. It subjects 
service providers to a potential loss of safe-harbor protection virtually 
any time they come into contact with user-submitted content. To avoid 
that, providers would have to choose between avoiding user content al-
together or removing anything that raises even a remote possibility of 
infringement. Both options are fundamentally at odds with the DMCA. 
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The first would at once leave online services toothless against the worst 
kind of anti-social material while making it more difficult for users to 
find useful content. The second would punish innocent users, silence a 
host of lawful speech, and erode the open nature of the Internet.  
Congress intended the safe harbors to resolve these dilemmas, not 
exacerbate them. And the statute has worked. As the experiences of 
amici show, the DMCA has helped make online services vital platforms 
for free expression and creativity. The district court’s ruling on red-flag 
knowledge threatens to undo those benefits. This Court should correct 
that mistake and hold that Vimeo is entitled to summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Red-Flag Knowledge Plays An Appropriately Limited Role 
In The DMCA Regime 
In crafting the DMCA’s knowledge provisions, Congress declined 
to require service providers to make “difficult judgments as to whether 
conduct is or is not infringing.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52. Instead, un-
less a service provider has actual (subjective) knowledge of infringe-
ment, it can be charged with knowledge only where it “turned a blind 
eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.” Id. at 48; see also Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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There is a “high bar” for finding red-flag knowledge. UMG Record-
ings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 
2009), aff’d sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 
LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). The infringing nature of the mate-
rial must be “apparent from even a brief and casual viewing.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 105-551 (II), at 58 (1998). The “common-sense result of this ‘red 
flag’ test” is that service providers are not “required to make discrimi-
nating judgments about potential copyright infringement.” Id. To the 
contrary, “if investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to 
identify material as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are 
not ‘red flags.’” Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (citation omitted).2  
Giving red-flag knowledge a limited role is fundamental to the 
DMCA’s structure. Rather than require service providers to make tough 
calls about infringement, the DMCA created a balanced notice-and-
takedown regime that serves as the primary mechanism for online cop-
                                      
2 Courts have repeatedly granted summary judgment to service pro-
viders where plaintiffs could not meet the DMCA’s strict standard for 
red-flag knowledge. See, e.g., Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1020-26; Via-
com Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113-15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746-
47 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Wolk v. Photobucket.com, Inc., 2014 
WL 2723035 (2d Cir. June 17, 2014); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
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yright enforcement. Under this regime, copyright owners must provide 
service providers with information (in a prescribed form) about what 
particular material on their systems is infringing. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)-
(3). When it receives a proper notice, the service provider must “expedi-
tiously” remove the identified material (§ 512(c)(1)(C)) and can provide 
the alleged infringer with a chance to submit a “counter notification” 
explaining that the material does not infringe (§ 512(g)). 
This system is efficient and effective. It provides a streamlined 
process for removing suspected infringing material from online services. 
It gives clarity to both service providers and copyright owners, setting 
the stage for voluntary cooperation. It reflects the significant ad-
vantages that copyright owners have in identifying infringement of 
their works. And it recognizes that not all suspected infringements are 
actually infringing, allowing users to push back against overreach by 
copyright holders.  
In short, the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime affords appro-
priate redress for infringement while letting legitimate service provid-
ers offer open platforms for user expression. Unilateral takedowns by 
service providers have none of those virtues. It is not surprising there-
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fore that Congress intended to confine the DMCA’s knowledge provi-
sions to cases where the provider needs to exercise no judgment because 
the infringing nature of the material is truly obvious. 
II. The DMCA’s Knowledge Provisions Reflect The Practical 
Difficulties That Online Services Face In Trying To Deter-
mine Whether User Material Is Infringing  
The DMCA’s knowledge standards reflect a very practical reality: 
it is extremely difficult for online services to determine, in the mass of 
material submitted by their users, what items are actually infringing. 
This fact makes it critical for courts to give red-flag knowledge the lim-
ited scope Congress intended it to have.  
A. Determining Infringement Requires Consideration Of Com-
plex Factual And Legal Questions 
Assessing copyright infringement is no easy task. “Infringement” 
is a legal conclusion informed by an array of legal and factual questions: 
• Is the material protected by copyright or might it be in the 
public domain? See generally Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012).  
• If it’s protected by copyright, who is the “author” of the 
work? See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53 (1884) (discussing authorship requirement); Garcia v. Google, 
Inc., 2014 WL 3377343 (9th Cir. July 11, 2014) (addressing 
whether an individual actor’s performance in a movie is copy-
rightable and, if so, who owns the relevant copyrights).  
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• Who holds the copyright(s) in the work? Is the work co-
owned by multiple copyright holders? Has any author assigned or 
transferred ownership of the copyright to someone else? See, e.g., 
Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 475 
(S.D.N.Y.) (defendant’s “lack of knowledge regarding true copy-
right ownership objectively reasonable” where ownership turned 
on “complex analysis of contractual arrangements going back 
twenty years”), opinion modified, 220 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), aff’d, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005). 
• Who uploaded the content to the service? Was the item up-
loaded by the copyright owner or its agent? See, e.g., Veoh, 665 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1110 n.13 (evidence that a popular band uploaded one 
of the band’s videos to online service sued for infringement). 
• If not, did the uploader have permission from any of the cop-
yright owners to upload the work? Was there an express license? 
An implied license? Did the copyright owner encourage or approve 
the uploading of the work? See, e.g., Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 
229, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Under federal law, ‘nonexclusive licenses 
may ... be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.’”) 
(quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A][7], at 10-43).  
• Even if the initial uploading was unauthorized, did the copy-
right owners know that the work had been posted and decide to 
acquiesce in its presence there? See, e.g., Keane Dealer Servs., Inc. 
v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (knowledge cou-
pled with acquiescence can amount to implied license). 
 
• Even if the posting was unauthorized, is it a fair use of the 
copyrighted material? 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 
These questions must be asked and answered each time an in-
fringement determination is to be made. Copyright infringement, in 
other words, isn’t like obscenity: you don’t just know it when you see it. 
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This bears directly on the red-flag knowledge inquiry. As a matter of 
law, an item is not infringing if it’s in the public domain, or if it was 
posted by the copyright owner, or has otherwise been authorized by the 
copyright owner, or if it’s a fair use. A service provider thus cannot have 
actual knowledge of infringement unless it knows that none of those 
things is true. Likewise, because red-flag awareness requires facts that 
make “the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable 
person” (Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31), such awareness does not exist unless 
the answer to each of those questions is obvious. If there is a reasonable 
basis for concluding that the item is in the public domain, or that it was 
posted by the copyright owner, or that it appears with the copyright 
owner’s express or implied permission, or that it’s fair use, there cannot 
be red-flag knowledge.  
It is no accident that the DMCA adopts such a stringent standard. 
Congress understood that online services generally lack the information 
needed to ascertain infringement. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (ex-
plaining that a service provider “could not be expected” in a brief en-
counter with material online to determine whether it “was still protect-
ed by copyright,” “whether the use was licensed,” and “whether it was 
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permitted under the fair use doctrine”); cf. Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Network, 
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]here is no assur-
ance that [the service provider] could have accurately identified the in-
fringing content in question.”). 
If anyone has the information necessary to answer these ques-
tions, it is the copyright owner. Rights holders know (or should know) 
what works they own, to whom they’ve licensed those works, whether 
and on what terms they want their material to appear on various online 
platforms, and what uses they consider harmful to the market for their 
works. Online services have little insight into any of these issues. It 
thus makes sense that the DMCA does not “place the burden of deter-
mining whether [materials] are actually illegal on a service provider.” 
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32 (quoting Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1023).  
B. Determining Ownership, Authorization, And Fair Use Is Es-
pecially Challenging For Online Services 
The operational environment faced by online services like amici 
only make it more challenging for them to make the determinations of 
copyright ownership, authorization, and fair use needed to have 
knowledge of infringement under the DMCA.  
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Ownership. Services like Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter are 
home to a massive and ever-increasing array of content from users 
around the world. New postings pour onto these platforms every second 
of every day in every language imaginable, referencing cultural trends, 
personalities, news events, and political issues big and small, main-
stream and niche, earth-shattering and banal. This material comes in 
many different forms: text, images, videos, music, and spoken-word 
files. Service providers often have little idea what much of this content 
is, to say nothing of who owns the relevant copyrights. Indeed, it is of-
ten unclear whether material originates with a professional content 
creator: in today’s culture, much of what looks or sounds professional 
was actually made by amateurs, and vice versa. 
Authorization. Similar problems beset online services in trying 
to determine whether particular material is authorized by the rights 
holder. Even if the user who posted an item did not create it, that user 
may have obtained permission (whether through a licensing agreement 
or something more informal) from a copyright holder to use the content. 
(It’s become increasingly easy for users to obtain such permissions, in-
cluding though Creative Commons licenses and other off-the-shelf li-
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censing regimes. E.g., https://creativecommons.org/licenses/.) Moreover, 
the copyright in many works is shared by separate co-owners, each of 
whom has the independent right to license use of the work. See Jasper 
v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 334, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“It 
is basic copyright law that joint authors may legally grant a license to a 
third party to exploit the work without co-author consent.”). And where 
such an understanding exists between the user and a copyright owner, 
the service provider is unlikely to know about it. But such arrange-
ments belie any assumption that material not posted by the actual crea-
tor is necessarily unauthorized.  
Compounding these difficulties are the actual practices of many 
copyright owners, who often welcome the presence of their material on 
user-submitted content platforms and take steps to encourage it. Artists 
and media companies often post their content to online service, in many 
cases without indication of where it’s coming from. See, e.g., Ethan 
Smith & Peter Lattman, Download This: YouTube Phenom Has a Big 
Secret, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB118903788315518780 (describing singer signed by 
major label who simultaneously was masquerading as an amateur on 
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YouTube and MySpace). There are countless instances of movie studios, 
television networks, and record labels authorizing their works to appear 
on online services for promotional purposes outside the context of tradi-
tional licensing arrangements. See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen 
Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling a Web of Deceit, 
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 421-22 (2010); Andrew M. Kaikati & Jack G. 
Kaikati, Stealth Marketing: How to Reach Consumers Surreptitiously, 
46 CAL. MGMT. REV. 6, 8-9 (2004) (discussing use of stealth-marketing 
tactics online). 
Copyright owners large and small recognize the value of user-
generated content services in helping generate “buzz” for their works 
and engage more directly with their fans. On Twitter, for example, a 
studio wishing to market a movie or a television show will often have 
their staff (including actors, writers, or producers) post Tweets with 
promotional content. In many cases, it is completely unclear who actual-
ly owns the rights to that content. What’s more, media companies and 
other copyright owners may deliberately decide not to request removal 
of certain user-posted items that include their copyrighted works, be-
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cause those items often provide valuable promotional and brand-
awareness benefits for the companies.3  
These marketing practices confirm the need for a tight red-flag 
knowledge standard. By quietly authorizing and deliberately allowing 
their content to appear on various online services, major copyright own-
ers have precluded any simple inference that the presence of even “well 
known” material amounts to infringement. Service providers seldom 
know which instances of such content have been authorized or tolerated 
by the rights holder and which have not. And there is no reason to make 
them guess. Instead, in the face of reasonable uncertainty about wheth-
er something is authorized, the DMCA sensibly permits online services 
to await instructions from the copyright owner in the form of a proper 
takedown notice. Cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. 
Supp. 2d 627, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“EMI itself regularly distributes 
works on the internet for free. Because of these activities, EMI’s execu-
tives concede that internet users, including MP3tunes’ users and execu-
                                      
3 All of these practices are vividly demonstrated by the extensive rec-
ord presented to this Court in the Viacom v. YouTube litigation. See Br. 
for Defendants-Appellees, at 44-53, Nos. 10-3270-CV & 10-3342-CV, 
2011 WL 1356930 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2011); Br. for Defendants-Appellees 
at 13-14, No. 13-1720-CV, 2013 WL 5870383 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2013).  
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tives, have no way of knowing for sure whether free songs on the inter-
net are unauthorized.”). 
Fair Use. Finally, even if a service provider has reason to know 
that a given item is unauthorized, fair use must still be considered be-
fore being required to remove that item under the DMCA. Cf. Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (copyright 
owners must make a good-faith consideration of fair use before sending 
takedown notices). This requires answering a number of additional 
questions: What was the nature of the original work? How much of that 
work was used? What was the purpose of the use? Is it a parody? Is the 
use commercial? How much does the use transform the original into 
something new? What is the effect of the new use on the market for the 
original work? See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
578-94 (1994) (assessing whether parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was 
fair use); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding reproduction of concert posters to be fair use). 
A fair use determination is a notoriously “open-ended and context-
sensitive inquiry.” Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006); see 
also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that the task of determining 
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fair use “is not to be simplified with bright-line rules” and instead calls 
for a “case-by-case analysis.”). Even courts struggle with these issues, 
often leading to nuanced, highly fact-specific rulings. See, e.g., Cariou v. 
Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705-11 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding artist’s use of cer-
tain photographs to be fair, while remanding for further consideration 
as to other photographs). 
The fair use issues confronting online services like amici are par-
ticularly vexing (and important) given the myriad ways that Internet 
users rely on existing works to create new expression. User-submitted 
material frequently uses well-known songs, movies, TV shows, and 
books as springboards for creative expression. Clips or pieces of such 
works are incorporated in the spirit of analysis, commentary, or parody.  
Music and video are “remixed,” “mashed-up,” or otherwise transformed 
into fan-fictions, image art, tributes, and commentary pieces. See gener-
ally Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 
961 (2004). Users add popular music to their home videos, add their 
own words to existing works, and reconfigure the news into comedy. 
See, e.g., Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52 (case involving home video of 
kids dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy”); http://textsfromhillary
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clinton.tumblr.com (Tumblr blog combining photograph of Hillary Clin-
ton on her Blackberry with photographs of other politicians and celebri-
ties on their phones with satirical captions); https://twitter.com/
NYTMinusContext (Twitter account that creates amusing Tweets by 
copying short excerpts from The New York Times, but out of context). 
Copyright owners often approve of (or tolerate) such uses, believ-
ing that they stimulate the market for their works and not wanting to 
antagonize fans. See, e.g., Casey Fiesler, Everything I Need To Know I 
Learned from Fandom: How Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the 
Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
729, 758 (2008) (“Just as many authors turn a blind eye to, or even en-
courage, fan fiction, some media corporations have publicly stated that 
they have no problem with fanvids and mash-ups.”). Properly applied, 
the red-flag knowledge provision gives fair use the room it needs by not 
forcing service providers to make judgment calls about whether uses 
like these are infringing. Instead, any item that raises a legitimate 
question about fair use cannot be a red flag.  
Under this standard, online services can allow users to post items 
that incorporate even well-known copyrighted material in ways that 
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have a legitimate claim to fair use. This lets creators create and pre-
serves the Internet as an open platform for free expression and trans-
formative creation. Cf. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 
1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (“First Amendment privileges are also pre-
served through the doctrine of fair use.”). By giving space to fair use in 
this way, the DMCA helps “fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 
(quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.)).  
III. Broadening The DMCA’s Knowledge Standards Would 
Frustrate The Statute’s Goals By Discouraging Providers 
From Monitoring Content And Helping Users Find It 
Relieving online services from having to resolve difficult copyright 
questions advances very practical objectives. The narrow cast of the 
DMCA’s knowledge provisions recognizes that providers interact with 
user-submitted content in a variety of ways. These interactions are ex-
tremely valuable. They protect services from offensive, malicious, and 
other objectionable material. And they allow services to help users lo-
cate the content and information most relevant and interesting to them. 
Departing from these standards would create serious disincentives for 
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engaging with content in these ways. Congress did not intend that, and 
it would have pernicious consequences for services and their users.  
A. Congress Gave Online Services Broad Leeway To Review 
User-Submitted Material For Pornography And Other Objec-
tionable Content  
While the DMCA makes clear that service providers have no obli-
gation to look through user-submitted content for possible copyright in-
fringements (§ 512(m)), the statute was “not intended to discourage the 
service provider from monitoring its service.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 
73 (1998). That Congress wanted to remove obstacles to voluntary mon-
itoring is confirmed by the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 
which was enacted shortly before the DMCA. Section 230 of the CDA 
gives broad leeway to online computer services to review and remove 
objectionable content from their systems. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (no 
online service “shall be held liable” on account of “any action voluntarily 
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, ex-
cessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable”).  
Taking up that invitation, most online services, including amici, 
make some effort to review the items posted on their services looking for 
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illegal or other objectionable material—including obscenity, child por-
nography, sexually explicit content, hate speech, sexual harassment, 
bullying, graphic violence, threats, and spam. Such content is prohibit-
ed by most providers’ terms of use. See, e.g., Pinterest “Acceptable Use 
Policy,” https://about.pinterest.com/en/acceptable-use-policy; “The Twit-
ter Rules,” https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules. 
As Tumblr’s “Community Guidelines” explain, online services “draw 
lines around a few narrowly defined but deeply important categories of 
content and behavior that jeopardize our users, threaten our infrastruc-
ture, and damage our community.” http://www.tumblr.com/policy/
en/community.  
Service providers police these rules in different ways. Pinterest al-
lows users to report objectionable material, which is then reviewed by 
employees. Tumblr employs a team that works to remove offending con-
tent. Twitter’s “Trust & Safety” team similarly reviews reports and es-
tablishes policies to protect its users from abuse on the service. See 
Kashmir Hill, Meet Del Harvey, Twitter’s Troll Patrol, Forbes, July 21, 
2014, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/02/
meet-del-harvey-twitters-troll-patrol/. These efforts require service pro-
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viders to interact with user-submitted content. Without looking at an 
item, a provider can’t determine whether the content violates its poli-
cies. Automated technologies can help, but there’s ultimately no substi-
tute for human beings. See Del Harvey, The Strangeness of Scale at 
Twitter, TED, March 2014, available at http://www.ted.com/talks/ 
del_harvey_the_strangeness_of_scale_at_twitter/. 
Making efforts to remove offensive, objectionable, or illegal mate-
rial benefits online services, their users, and the public. While most us-
ers of services like Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter contribute legitimate 
content, there is always a minority that abuses the freedom that online 
platforms offer. Videos depicting child abuse, sexual torture, or graphic 
violence; postings that harass or bully others; messages aimed at de-
frauding members of the public—such content deeply offends users and 
can put them at risk of harm. It also distracts from the legitimate mate-
rial that more responsible users post and undermines the community 
that online services are trying to build. Consistent with their commit-
ment to protecting freedom of speech, service providers thus have con-
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siderable cause to monitor user-submitted content in ways that have 
nothing to do with looking for possible copyright infringement.4  
As indicated above, Congress approved of such review and wanted 
to eliminate disincentives for service providers to engage in it. The 
DMCA’s knowledge provisions reflect that understanding. By insisting 
that infringement be truly obvious, the DMCA allows online services to 
continue their valuable content-review efforts without exposing them-
selves to loss of the safe harbor because they do not remove material 
that may turn out to have been infringing. This affords much-needed 
breathing space to service providers. Without it, they would be faced 
with a stark choice between preserving their DMCA protection and tak-
ing steps to stamp out harmful and even unlawful uses of their services. 
That is not what Congress wanted.  
                                      
4 Reviewing content for terms-of-use violations is fundamentally dif-
ferent from investigating infringement. As discussed above, discerning 
what is infringing requires a complex analysis based on information not 
readily apparent from the content itself. By contrast, whether material 
is pornographic or excessively violent can be determined simply by look-
ing at it. And, unlike with copyright infringement, there is typically no 
third-party better positioned to make the necessary assessments. 
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B. The DMCA’s Knowledge Provisions Were Crafted To Allow 
Service Providers To Review Online Material To Help Users 
Find What They Want 
Online services also have more positive reasons for interacting 
with user-submitted content. Service providers play an important role 
in classifying and organizing material on the Internet, and human re-
view is often needed to do so effectively. By helping users find relevant 
items in what may be a sea of content, these interactions make online 
services more useful and better able to facilitate creative expression. In 
enacting the DMCA, Congress expressly recognized the importance of 
this kind of manual review and crafted the statute’s strict knowledge 
standard specifically to give services the room needed to do it.  
Online services like Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter facilitate ac-
cess by users to a massive amount of content, with new material pour-
ing in constantly from every corner of the globe. Without at least some 
order and organization, users may not be able to find what they’re look-
ing for, and the best and most interesting postings may get lost. To pre-
vent that, service providers take steps to help users identify and more 
readily access the content that is particularly relevant and interesting 
to their users. 
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These organizational measures often demand engagement with 
users’ material. Service providers review and classify user-submitted 
items to make them easier to find. This puts employees of the service in 
direct contact with those items as they try to determine the appropriate 
“tag” to place so that subsequent users’ searches return responsive ma-
terial. Likewise, providers may sift through postings in an effort to de-
cide which ones should be placed on what portions of the service, which 
might be of special value, or which may create unique excitement. 
Tumblr, for example, categorizes blogs by subject matter (such as archi-
tecture, fashion, and travel) to help its users discover relevant and com-
pelling content. Twitter has a custom timelines feature that allows us-
ers (and Twitter’s own staff) to create a timeline of Tweets related in 
some useful manner. See https://blog.twitter.com/2013/introducing-
custom-timelines. 
The public benefit of such interactions can be illustrated by the 
role that Twitter and other services played in the Arab Spring of 2011. 
By highlighting and tagging relevant posts, these services made it pos-
sible for users across the globe to track and join the conversation, for 
those on the ground to share their experiences with an engaged audi-
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ence, and for media outlets and governments to observe conditions and 
trends in real-time. See Philip N. Howard, et al., Opening Closed Re-
gimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?, 
Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, Sept. 11, 2011, 
available at http://pitpi.org/?p=1051. 
Even in less politically impactful scenarios, service providers’ con-
tent-organization efforts are important. By interacting with user-
submitted material, providers can bring the best and most interesting 
content to the fore. This benefits talented amateur artists and creators, 
whose works otherwise might not get the recognition they deserve. For 
example, each day Tumblr’s “Radar” feature shines a spotlight on a 
handful of posts from the service’s millions of active bloggers that most 
captivate Tumblr’s staff. Radar sparks conversation across the network 
and helps inspire users’ creativity. Being included in Radar gives the 
featured bloggers and their content more attention, often significantly 
increasing their views, followers, and interactions. 
Organizing content effectively also helps users find and bond with 
like-minded individuals. This community-building is one of the most 
important features offered by online service providers, and it often re-
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quires some involvement on the part of service providers’ employees. 
See, e.g., https://www.tumblr.com/meetups. Community managers may 
need to participate in user groups to respond to questions or complaints, 
to remove images unrelated to the purpose of the group, or to help iden-
tify content that would be especially interesting to the community.  
In enacting the DMCA, Congress recognized the importance of al-
lowing service providers to use human review to help make online con-
tent more accessible. As the legislative history explains: “Information 
location tools are essential to operation of the Internet; without them, 
users would not be able to find the information they need.” S. REP. NO. 
105-190, at 49. The use of “human judgment and editorial discretion” in 
organizing content is particularly “valuable” in this regard, and protect-
ing such interactions was a key goal of the DMCA safe harbors:  
[T]here is concern that online directories prepared by human 
editors and reviewers, who view and classify various Inter-
net sites, would be denied eligibility to the information loca-
tion tools safe harbor, in an unintended number of cases and 
circumstances. This is an important concern because such 
online directories play a valuable role in assisting Internet 
users to identify and locate the information they seek on the 
decentralized and dynamic networks of the Internet. 
Id. at 48-49.  
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The strict knowledge rules that Congress crafted were integral to 
this protection. By precluding a finding of knowledge absent actual 
knowledge or “red flags” making infringement “obvious” based on a 
“brief and casual viewing,” the DMCA was designed to ensure that 
online services would be able to “view and classify” online content so 
that their users can “identify and locate the information they seek.” Id. 
And Congress clearly instructed that the “knowledge or awareness 
standard should not be applied in a manner which would create a disin-
centive to the development of directories which involve human interven-
tion.” Id. at 49 (emphasis added).5  
Unfortunately, this is exactly what the decision below does. Sug-
gesting that red-flag knowledge exists merely because Vimeo employees 
                                      
5 This legislative history relates to the § 512(d) safe harbor, but it 
applies equally to § 512(c). For one thing, the red-flag knowledge provi-
sions in the two safe harbors are identical. Compare § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) 
with § 512(d)(1)(B). For another, this Court has squarely held that 
§ 512(c) covers functions “performed for the purpose of facilitating ac-
cess to user-stored material.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39 (internal marks 
and citation omitted). This safe harbor does not require services to be 
passive “storage lockers”; instead, like § 512(d), it allows them to inter-
act with user-submitted content in ways that help users “locate and 
gain access” to that material. Id. at 39-40 (internal marks and citation 
omitted). 
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interacted with user-posted items that used “well known” copyrighted 
works ignores Congress’s instruction that a service provider should not 
lose the safe harbor “merely because it saw one or more well known 
photographs of a celebrity.” Id. at 48. By departing from this standard, 
that ruling threatens to deter providers from using human intervention 
to help arrange or catalogue the content on their systems. Not only does 
that frustrate a key purpose of the DMCA, it would materially diminish 
the quality of online services. They would be less organized, users would 
have a harder time finding or identifying the items they want, and the 
most deserving content might get lost amid an undifferentiated mass of 
user-submitted material.  
C. Proper Application Of The DMCA’s Knowledge Provisions 
Protects Legitimate Online Expression 
By removing the need to make difficult judgments about in-
fringement, the DMCA gives service providers freedom to limit objec-
tionable content and to keep the material on their systems organized 
and accessible. The district court’s decision threatens to erode that free-
dom, by applying red-flag knowledge more expansively than Congress 
intended. Such an application would have profound consequences for 
service providers, their users, and the Internet more broadly.  
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If they are unable to review user-submitted material without fear 
that every missed infringement might cost them the safe harbor, service 
providers will be left with two distasteful choices. First, they could stop 
engaging with user content altogether. While that might help avoid a 
finding of knowledge, it would profoundly diminish the quality of online 
services for all the reasons discussed above: it would allow highly offen-
sive and even unlawful content to run unchecked, while leaving service 
providers unable to make good content more easily available to users.   
 Alternatively, service providers could respond by removing any 
user-posted items they find that raise even a question about copyright 
infringement. That result would be just as bad. Inevitably, much of the 
material that would be removed in such purges would not be infringing. 
What seemed questionable would turn out to be original, approved by 
the copyright owner, or fair use. Eliminating such innocent content does 
a disservice to users and the public. It would take important voices out 
of the cultural conversation, demoralize users trying to make them-
selves heard, and leave online services far less free and open. Cf. Wolk, 
840 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (“[A] policy under which Photobucket assumes 
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infringement could result in Photobucket unlawfully blocking others 
from uploading images to which they hold valid licenses.”). 
This would be especially problematic when it comes to fair use. 
Fair use is “an integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of that law.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 250 (internal 
marks and citation omitted). As described above, services like amici 
host many user-submitted items that are legitimate candidates for fair-
use protection—image mash-ups and memes on Tumblr; short, six-
second video clips on Twitter; and thumbnail photographs linking to 
full-size images on other websites posted on Pinterest, just to give a few 
examples. Removing such material would deprive users of their right to 
appropriate existing culture into new works. And it would diminish the 
public’s ability to view, enjoy, and be inspired by those creations. This 
result has serious consequences for free expression online—the “unnec-
essary removal of non-infringing material causes significant injury to 
the public where time-sensitive or controversial subjects are involved.” 
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; cf. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1277 (where a 
“viable fair use defense is available,” issuing an injunction is “at odds 
with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright 
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law”). And all of this is contrary to the DMCA’s purpose to ensure “that 
the variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to ex-
pand.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8. 
CONCLUSION 
For nearly two decades, the DMCA has helped the Internet flour-
ish by allowing online services to interact with user-submitted content 
in various beneficial ways. Proper application of the statute’s knowledge 
standards is integral to the protections that the DMCA provides. The 
district court misapplied those standards and deprived Vimeo of the 
safe harbor. This Court should correct that error. 
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